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Abstract
TheRendezvous search problem asks how two noncomunnicating players, whomove
at unit-speed after a random placement in the search region (in this article, the line),
can minimize their expected meeting time. Baston and Gal (2001) solved a version
where each player leaves a marker at his starting point, for example parachutes left
after jumping into the search region. Here we consider that one or both players have
markers which they can drop at chosen times. When the players are placed facing
random directions at a distance D on the line the optimal expected meeting times R
are known to be as follows: With no markers, R = 13D/8; with one each dropped at
the start, R = 3D/2. Here we show that when only one player has a marker, but it can
be dropped at any time, we still have R = 3D/2, obtained by dropping the marker at
time D/4. Having both players drop markers at chosen times does not further reduce
R.We adopt a new algorithmic approachwhich first fixes the dropping times and then
reduces the resulting problem to a finite one. We also consider evanescent markers,
which are detectable for a specified time T after being dropped, modeling pheromone
scent markers used by some species in mate search or stain dropped by sailors. From
a less theoretical and more practical point of view, we can see our problem as that
faced by two hikers who get separated when they are walking not too far from a
coast. A reasonable Rendezvous strategy is for each of them to head in the general
direction of the coastline. On reaching the sea, they can calculate (based on their
speed and time taken to reach to coast) the maximum distance along the coastline
where the other one arrives. Then they can use our solution, taking that distance as
our parameter D. Of course if it turns out that they reached the sea at points closer
thanD, their Rendezvous time will only be shorter. So our solution can be interpreted
as a worst case expected meeting time. The marker might be a note scribbled on the
sand, or a pile of rocks. Perhaps before getting separated they would have decided
which roles (I or II) each would take up, being careful and cautious hikers. So in
particular the hiker taking the role of the marker placer would put down a marker of
some sort when he had walked along the coast one quarter the maximum distance
to his partner. If the other finds it, he would know for sure the direction of the hiker
who dropped it. Another thing to take away from this article is our result that says
“two markers are not better than one.” This observation has some significance in
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the mate search context, where males and females use pheromone deposits to help
find each other. In most species, it is only the females who can make such deposits,
and the males can detect it. Giving both species the depositing facility would be
more costly in terms of energy and, given our negative result, might not significantly
reduce Rendezvous times. So in a speculative sense, our result has some explanatory
value in this context.
KEYWORDS
algorithmic solution, markers, optimal solution, Rendezvous problem, Rendezvous
search on the line
1 INTRODUCTION
The asymmetric Rendezvous problem on the line, introduced
by Alpern and Gal (1995) seeks the least expected time R
(called the Rendezvous value) required for two unit-speed
players to meet, after initially placed a distance D apart on
the line and faced in random directions. Alpern and Gal
found a strategy pair which minimizes the meeting time with
R= 13D/8. It is a modification of the “wait for Mommy”
strategy where one player searches and the other stays still.
Subsequently Baston and Gal (2001) considered a variation
they called “markstart Rendezvous,” where both players leave
markers at their starting points which can be detected by the
other player on arriving at that location. They found that the
associated markstart Rendezvous value is Rms = 3D/2. Here
we consider a generalization of the Baston-Gal idea by giv-
ing one or both players a marker which can be dropped at any
time. Thus a player’s strategy consists of a path (relative to
his starting point and direction) and a dropping time. We find
that when only one player has a marker which can be dropped
at any time, the Rendezvous value is given by R1 = 3D/2
and the optimal dropping time is D/4. If that marker must be
dropped off at the start, it is worthless in that the Rendezvous
value remains at 13D/8, the Rendezvous time with no mark-
ers. On the other hand, if we give both players a marker
which they can each drop off at a time of their choice, the
Rendezvous value is no better than the 3D/2 which we would
have if only one of them had a marker, or if they both had to
drop at the start.
We obtain these results in part by a new algorithmic
approach in which we first fix the dropping time(s) and
then reduce this problem to a finite set of admissible strate-
gies which can be solved by computational enumeration.
This approach might enable similar problems in higher
dimensions to be solved. We also consider a variation
in which the markers have a limited shelf life T , after
which they cannot be detected. One interpretation is that
the markers are pheromones which evaporate over time.
Another is stain which can be dropped by sailors but won’t
last forever, or flares that can be seen for a short period
of time.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The Rendezvous search problem was first proposed by Alpern
in a seminar given at the Institute for Advanced Study, Vienna
(Alpern, 1976). Many years passed before the problems
presented there were properly modeled. The first model,
where the players could only meet at a discrete set of loca-
tions, was analyzed in Anderson and Weber (1990). This
difficult problem was later solved for three locations in
Weber (2012). Rendezvous-evasion on discrete locations was
studied (Lim, 1997) and solved for two locations (boxes) in
Gal and Howard (2005).
The Rendezvous search problem for continuous space and
time, including the infinite line, was introduced in Alpern
(1995). The player-asymmetric form of the problem (used
in this article), where players can adopt distinct strate-
gies, was introduced in Alpern and Gal (1995)). In Baston
and Gal (2001), the authors allowed the players to leave
markers at their starting points. The last two articles form
the starting point of the present article. The correspond-
ing player-symmetric problem on the line was developed
in Anderson and Essegaier (1995) and successively in Bas-
ton (1999), Gal (1999), Han, Du, Vera, and Zuluaga (2008).
These articles assumed that the initial distance between the
players on the line was known. The version where the initial
distance between the players is unknown was studied in Bas-
ton andGal (1998), Alpern and Beck (1999), Alpern and Beck
(2000) and Ozsoyeller, Beveridge, and Isler (2013).
The continuous Rendezvous problem has also been exten-
sively studied on finite networks: the unit interval and circle
(Howard, 1999); arbitrary networks (Alpern, 2002b); planar
grids (Anderson & Fekete, 2001; Chester & Tütüncü, 2004);
and the star graph (Kikuta & Ruckle, 2007).
An application of Rendezvous to robotic exploration is
given in Roy and Dudek (2001). An application of Ren-
dezvous to the communications problem of finding a common
channel is given in Chang, Liao, and Lien (2015). A survey of
the Rendezvous search problem is given in Alpern (2002a).
3 FORMALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM(S)
We begin by presenting the formalization of the problem
when there are no markers, as given in Alpern and Gal (1995).
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Two players, I and II, are placed a distance D apart on the
real line, and faced in random directions which they call
“forward.” Their common aim is to minimize the expected
amount of time required to meet. They each know the distance
but not the direction to the other player. They are restricted to
moving at unit-speed, so their position, relative to their start-
ing point and measured in their “forward” direction, is given
by a function f (t)∈ where,
 = {f ∶ [0T]→ R, f (0) = 0, |f (t) − f (t′)| ≤ |t − t′|}, (1)
for some T sufficiently large so that Rendezvous will have
taken place. In fact optimal paths turn out to be much simpler.
Wewill see that optimal paths are piecewise linear with slopes
±1 and so they can be specified by their turning points. Sup-
pose player I chooses path f ∈ and Player II chooses path
g∈ . The meeting time depends on which way they are ini-
tially facing. If they are facing each other, the meeting time is
given by,
t1 = t→← = min{t ∶ f (t) + g(t) = D}.
If they are facing away from each other, the meeting time is
given by,
t2 = t←→ = min{t ∶ −f (t) − g(t) = D}.
If they are facing the same way, say both left, and I is on
the left, the meeting time is given by,
t3 = t←← = min{t ∶ −f (t) + g(t) = D}.
If I is on the left and they are both facing right, the meeting
time is given by,
t4 = t→→ = min{t ∶ +f (t) − g(t) = D}.
To summarize, the four meeting times when strategies
(paths) f and g are chosen are given by the four values,
min{t ∶ ±f (t)±g(t) = D}.
The Rendezvous time for given strategies is their expected
meeting time
R(f , g) = 1
4
(t1 + t2 + t3 + t4). (2)
The Rendezvous value R is the optimum expected meeting
time,
R = min
f ,g∈
R(f , g) = R(f , g). (3)
We now illustrate these ideas by exhibiting two spe-
cific strategy pairs. We first consider the so called “Wait
for Mommy” strategy pair [f W , gW ] in which Baby (Player
I) stays still (f W (t)≡ 0) while Mommy looks for him by
first going to +D and then to −D (gW (t)= t for t≤D and
gW (t)=D− (t−D)= 2D− t for t≥D). In this case t1 = t4 =D
while t2 = t3 = 3D, with a mean Rendezvous time of 2D. This
strategy pair was improved in Alpern and Gal (1995) to the
strategy pair [f *, g*], called the Modified Wait for Mommy,
where Mommy still plays g* = gW (goes to +D and then to
−D) but Baby goes out at time 0 to meet a possibly approach-
ing Mommy at time D/2 and then returns to his start to meet
FIGURE 1 Plots of f * (green dashed) and g* (black), D= 2 [Color figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Mommy if she is coming from the other direction. If they
haven’t met by time D, Baby knows that Mommy went in the
wrong direction and is now approaching him, but again does
not know from which direction. More precisely, we have,
f ∗(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
t t ≤ D∕2,
D∕2 − (t − D∕2) D∕2 ≤ t ≤ D,
t − D D ≤ t ≤ 2D,
D − (t − 2D) 2D ≤ t ≤ 3D = T .
g∗(t) =
{
t t ≤ D,
D − (t − D) t ≥ D.
(4)
The pair [f *, g*] keeps the Wait for Mommy meeting times
t2 = 3D and t3 =D but advances the other two to t1 =D/2
and t4 = 2D. The strategies f * and g* are drawn together in
Figure 1 for initial distance D= 2.
A useful way to see the meeting times for a strategy pair,
say [f , g], is to plot the Player I strategy starting at location
(height) 0 and to plot four versions of the Player II strat-
egy: starting at +D and facing up or down; starting at −D
and facing up or down. We call these four motions respec-
tively the four “agents” of Player II. In this way, the problem
is derandomized and player I must Rendezvous with each
deterministic agents instead of with random player II. Specif-
ically, the agents 1, 2, 3, 4 of II respectively follow paths
D− g(t), −D− g(t), −D+ g(t) and +D+ g(t). If we solve for
f (ti) in the definition of ti we see that ti is the first time that
f (t) (Player I) meets agent i of Player II. For the pair [f *, g*]
the meeting times ti are given by,
t1 = D∕2, t2 = 3D, t3 = D and t4 = 2D,
with Rendezvous time
R(f ∗, g∗) = (D∕2 + 3D + D + 2D)∕4 = 13D∕8.
We have plotted f * and the four agents ±D± g*(t) of Player
II in Figure 2 (the “Wait for Mommy” strategy pair), circling
the meeting points of Player I with the four agents of II.
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FIGURE 2 Plot of f * and four agents of g* [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
It is sometimes useful to label the four meeting times
{t1, t2, t3, t4} of a strategy pair in increasing order. We do
this by using subscripts rather than superscripts. In general
we have t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3 ≤ t4, where {t1, t2, t3, t4}= {t1, t2, t3, t4}.
For example, the pair [f *, g*] has increasing meeting times
of t1 = t1 =D/2, t2 = t3 =D, t3 = t4 = 2D, t4 = t2 = 3D. Thus
when meeting times are given in subscripted form, they are
being listed in the order of meeting.
Another notational convention, for strategies [f , g] that are
piecewise linear with slopes ±1, is to assume that they start
in the forward direction and simply to list their turning points
in a square bracket. Thus f * = [D/2, D, 2D] and g* = [D]. It
has been shown in the original “no marker” case that optimal
paths are of the form,
f = [f1, f2,… , fk], (5)
where the numbers f j are the turning times of the path f (t).
When a player has a marker to drop, the strategy will be given
in the form,
f = [x; f1, f2,… , fk], (6)
where the marker is dropped at time x.
If a player comes upon a marker droped by the other player,
he learns the direction of the other player. So we can assume
the following.
Remark 3.1 If a player comes across a marker
left by the other, he moves at unit-speed in the
direction of the other player until they meet.
We summarize the two known results in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 (Alpern & Gal, 1995; Baston &
Gal, 2001)
1. [10] If neither player has a marker, an opti-
mal strategy pair is given by the “Modified Wait
for Mommy” pair as defined in (4), and the
Rendezvous value is 13D/8.
2. [17] If both players have a marker which must
be dropped at time x = 0, it is optimal for both
players to adopt the strategy [0;D]. In this case
the Rendezvous value is 3D/2. (See Theorem 9
and Figure 7 for more details.)
We prove in Proposition 3 that optimal strategies are of the
form of (6). The computational implication of this result is
that there are only a finite number of strategies that may be
optimal, provided that x is fixed. Hence, by checking all of
them we are able to find out the optimal strategies when x
is known. By computing the optimal solutions for x belong-
ing to a mesh we identify upper bound for our problems, see
Section 4. In Section 5, we prove the pivotal Proposition 3
and describe how implementation of the program can be done.
Finally, in Section 6we show how to derive lower bound of the
values of the games given the optimal solutions computed for
fixed values of x. In Section 7 we present the results obtained
when both players have a marker to drop off, showing that two
markers are no better than one. In Section 9 we present results
for evanescence markers which can be detected within a fixed
time of being dropped.
4 SOLUTION TO THE ONE MARKER GAME
In this section we present our solution, Theorem 2, to the
single marker game, where only Player II has the single
marker. We present a strategy pair (̂f , ĝ) where the marker is
dropped by II at time D/4, which is easily shown to have Ren-
dezvous time 3D/2. The second part of the proof of Theorem
2, that no other strategy does better, is given in Section 8 with
the additional assumption that Player II always turns when
dropping the marker. This supplementary assumtion is very
reasonnable and likely to be true. However, in this article we
prefer to keep advantage of the results of numerical compu-
tations and do not delve into a too much complicated proof.
An numerical proof that no strategy does much better will be
given in Section 6.
Theorem 2 (Single Marker Game) A solu-
tion for the Rendezvous problem on the line with
a single marker (possessed by II) is as follows:
f̂ = [3D∕4], ĝ = [D∕4;D∕4, 3D∕4, 7D∕4].
That is, the Player II with the marker drops it at time D/4.
The Rendezvous value for this problem is given by
R = R(̂f , ĝ) ≤ 3D∕2.
For turn-on-drop strategies (see Section 8), we have
R = R(̂f , ĝ) = 3D∕2.
Proof It is easily calculated, as in Figure 4,
that the meeting times are given by
t1 = t4 = 3D∕4, t2 = t1 = D, t3 = t3 = 7D∕4,
t4 = t2 = 5D∕2.
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FIGURE 3 Solution of the one marker game. Horizontal dotted lines
indicate stationary location of dropped marker by various agents. Dashed
line indicates I’s motion upon finding marker [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Consequently we have
R(̂f , ĝ) =
3D∕4 + D + 7D∕4 + 5D∕2
4
= 3D∕2.
This proves that R ≤ 3D∕2. ▪
The second part of Theorem 2, for strategies which turn
when dropping a marker (turn-on-drop strategies), is proved
in Section 8.
In Section 6 we show that the Rendezvous value for this
problem is very close (or equal) to 3D/2.
Notice that only the player playing ĝ has a marker at dis-
posal. In Figure 3, Player II plays ĝ and the marker is dropped
off at time D/4. We observe that at time 3D/4 the Player I tra-
jectory forks given that he finds the marker of Player II or not.
5 PROPERTIES OF SOLUTION TO ONE OR
TWO MARKER GAMES
In this section we present a general result on the turning points
of optimal solutions to the one or two marker (one marker
for each player) games. We show moreover that if a strat-
egy pair is a Nash equilibrium in such a game then a player
following either of these strategies can only turn at a lim-
ited number of times: when he drops or finds a marker, or
(calling him Player I) when he meets an agent of the other
player. Since there are fourmeeting times and only onemarker
there are at most six turning times and hence at most 4096
strategies to check for optimality.1 The following result, which
restricts turning times, is similar in spirit to previous results
such a Lemma 5.1 of Alpern and Gal (1995) or Theorem
16.10 of Alpern and Gal (2003). The optimality condition of
1Indeed, at each turning point there are at most 4 possible motions resulting
from Player I and Player II turning or keeping the same direction. Hence, the
upper bound results 46 = 4096.
Proposition 3 holds not only for optimal strategies (those min-
imizing the Rendezvous time) but for strategy pairs where
if either unilaterally changes the Rendezvous time cannot
decrease (Nash equilibrium of a common interest game).
Proposition 3 Let G be any Rendezvous game
on the line where each player has at most one
marker. Then in any Nash equilibrium (NE) for
G (and in particular at any optimal strategy
pair) each player moves at unit-speed in a fixed
direction (no turns) on each of the time inter-
vals J determined by times 0, and the following
times c:
1 The meeting times c = ti when he meets the
agent i of the other player
2 The times c when he finds the marker
dropped by agent i.
3 The time c = x that he drops off a marker
Proof Assume on the contrary that for some
NE strategy pair (f , g), Player I (say) fails the
condition on some time interval J = [b, c] of the
asserted type. Suppose his path is given by f (t).
There are three cases, depending on the what
happens at time c.
1 At time c = ti Player I first meets agent i.
Since the stated condition fails on J, Player I
can modify his strategy inside the interval J
so that he arrives at the meeting location f (c)
at an earlier time c − e. At time c − e, agent i
of Player II is either at location f (c) or lies in
some direction (call this i’s direction) from
f (c). In the former case the meeting with i
is moved forward to time c − e. So Player I
can stay there in until time c and then resume
his original strategy, so all other meeting
times are unchanged. Otherwise, Player I
goes in i’s direction at unit-speed on interval
[c− e, c− e/2] and then back to f (c) at time c,
when he resumes his original strategy. This
brings the meeting time with i no later than
c − e/2, without changing any other meeting
times, lowering the expected meeting time.
In either case the expected Rendezvous time
is lowered, contradicting the assumption that
f was an optimal response to g.
2 At time c, Player I finds the marker
dropped by agent i. If the marker has just
been dropped off at time c, then I also meets
agent i at time c, so the previous case applies.
Otherwise there is some earliest time c − e
that I can arrive at location f (c). Suppose
Player I modifies his strategy (path) on J so
that he arrives at f (c) at time c − e.If the
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marker is not yet present, then Player I con-
tinues until meeting agent i and goes back
at f (c) before time c and then resumes with
the original strategy. Themeetingmust occur
because agent i drops off the marker at f (c)
before time c.If the marker is present, after
time c − e Player I continues towards II (he
now knows the direction) and will reach him
earlier than in his original strategy.
3 At time c = x, Player I drops off a marker
found at later time. Suppose Player I mod-
ifies f to get earlier to the dropoff location
f (c) at time c − e, drops off the marker, and
then stays still until time c, and resumes with
the original strategy f . After time c − e, case
1. or 2. occurs and, because I is not moving
at full speed on the time interval starting at
time c− e the strategy can be further refined.
This contradicts the assumption that f was a
best response. ▪
6 SINGLE MARKER STRATEGY WHEN
DROPPING TIME IS KNOWN
In this section we consider a simpler game G(x) where the
player (II) possessing the marker must drop it at a fixed time
x, and we show how to calculate the Rendezvous value R(x)
for this restricted game. A corollary of Proposition 3, Corol-
lary 4 below, shows that for any fixed dropping time x, there
are only a finite number of potentially optimal strategy pairs
for the game G(x), and we develop an algorithm that quickly
optimizes over these possibilities. By letting x vary within a
fine mesh, we can approximate the solution to the unrestricted
single marker game. Bounds on the values R(x) when x does
not belong to the mesh of calculated values can be attained by
our variational result Proposition 5.
We begin by applying Proposition 3 to show that the search
for a solution to the game G(x) can be restricted to a finite
number of strategy pairs.
Corollary 4 In the restricted game G(x) there
are only a finite number of candidates for opti-
mality and these admit representations as in (5)
and (6).
Proof First assume the marker must be
dropped at time x. The first potential turning
time is given by c = min(x, D/2), according
to Proposition 3. Assume x < D/2. Then we
branch into two cases, depending on whether
Player II turns when he drops the marker. If
he doesn’t turn, the next potential turning time
is D/2, which is a meeting time. By similarly
branching and looking at all cases, we generate
a finite number of potentially optimal strategy
FIGURE 4 Value of the marker game computed dropping times in a
regular mesh with initial distance D= 16 [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
x-a x+ax
FIGURE 5 Illustration of Proposition 5 . The dots represent the values of
R(x) computed on the mesh [x− a, x, x+ a], the dotted line is obtained by
linear interpolation between the points and the lines with slopes 𝛼 represent
lower bound of the function R(x) for values outside the mesh [Color figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
pairs, and determine a restricted optimal solu-
tion satisfying (5) and (6). ▪
We note that this result also applies to the two marker game,
where we shall use it in Section 7.
We know from Corollary 4 that the solution can be com-
puted if the dropping time is fixed. To bound the optimal
Rendezvous values R for the marker game we compute R(x)
for x at a discrete mesh of values for the dropping time x, as
plotted in Figure 4,2 and use these values to bound R. Indeed,
Proposition 5 makes possible the derivation of bounds for
R(x) for dropping times x that do not belong to the mesh of
computed values. This proposition is illustrated in Figure 5.
Proposition 5 The Rendezvous value R(x) of
the game if the marker is dropped off at time x
satisfies for 𝛼 ≥ 0
R(x + 𝛼) ≤ R(x) + 𝛼. (7)
That is, dropping off the marker a little
later does not increase the Rendezvous times
very much.
2The program may be found at http://cui.unige.ch/∼leonep/AlpernLeone
Journal/prgRDVOneMarkPlotArticle.java.
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Proof Let (f (t), g(t)) be an optimal strategy
with dropoff time x, with Rendezvous timeR(x).
Consider a new strategy where both players wait
for a time 𝛼 and then follow the original strategy,
that is, they adopt (f (t− 𝛼), g(t− 𝛼)). The new
strategy has dropoff time x + 𝛼 and Rendezvous
time R(x) + 𝛼, which implies inequality 7. ▪
Corollary 6 The function R(x) is left contin-
uous. It follows that for any interval (x, y] the
function R(z) has a lower bound depending on
its values at the endpoint given by
R(z) ≥ m(x, y) = R(y) + (x − y), (8)
with z ∈ (x, y].
To estimate the minimum of R(x), we apply Corollary 6 on
each interval of the form (0.00016 n, 0.00016 (n+ 1)] forming
a partition of (0,D] and take the minimum. This is the interval
(3.99984, 4], with,
m(3.99984,4) = 24 − .00016 = 23.99984
Using this bound we obtain a global bound for the Ren-
dezvous value R of the single marker game. This result is
stated in Proposition 7.
Figure 4 shows the plot of the Rendezvous values for var-
ious dropping times. The minimal value computed is 24 for
dropping time 4.0. We show in Table 1 the values com-
puted on the regular mesh around the better dropping times
observed.
Proposition 7 For initial distance D = 16 the
Rendezvous value satisifes 23.99984 ≤ R ≤ 24
and the optimal time to drop the marker lies in
the interval [3.99984, 4]. This implies that for a
general initial distance D, we have that the Ren-
dezvous value satisfies
(
3
2
− 10−5
)
D ≤ R ≤
3D
2
and the optimal dropping time lies in the
interval
[(
1
4
− 10−5
)
D, D
4
]
.
An anonymous referee has suggested that our numerical
work could be improved by using the Divide Best Sector
(DiBS) algorithm (Craparo, Karatas, & Kuhn, 2017) to refine
the computations in sectors where the lower bound obtained
with Corollary 6 does not prevent the existence of an optimal
solution.
7 TWO MARKERS ARE NO BETTER THAN
ONE
In this section we show that giving both agents a marker does
not result in a lower Rendezvous time than just giving one a
marker (the case already analyzed). Taking our usual nomal-
ization of initial distance as D= 16, either model (one or two
markers) gives a Rendezvous value of R = 24. More accu-
rately, since we will calculate Rendezvous values only for a
grid of dropoff time pairs, analogous towhat we did in Section
6, we show that with two markers the Rendezvous value is not
much less than 24. Of course we know that the Rendezvous
value for two markers cannot be greater than for one marker,
so cannot be greater than 24. This fact is also shown by Bas-
ton and Gal (2001), who showed that this is the Rendezvous
time when both drop their markers at time 0. Our method is
to apply Proposition 3 to calculate the minimum Rendezvous
time R(l1, l2) when the players drop off their respective mark-
ers at times l1 and l2, so that the Rendezvous value R2 in the
two marker case is given by R2 = minl1,l2R(l1, l2). Baston and
Gal find that R(0, 0) = 24 and we have shown earlier that
R(∞, 4) = 24,whereby l1 =∞we mean that Player I does not
drop off his marker until all meetings have taken place (or not
at all). We find that,
minl1,l2R(l1, l2) = 24,where l1, l2 are taken in a fine grid.
Of course lower values of R(l1, l2) are possible for l1, l2 not
in the grid, but the same type of interpolation estimates as in
Section 6, show that the minimum over all l1 and l2 cannot
be much less than 24. We determine all regions of l1, l2 space
where the minimum is close to 24.3
Proposition 8 When the agents have initial
distance D and each one has a marker which
can be dropped at any time the least expected
meeting time R satisfies
R2 ≥ 24 − 0.00032,when D = 16, and more generally,
R2 ≥
(
3
2
− 0.00002
)
D, for arbitrary D. (9)
Proof Proposition 3 is still valid when both
players have a marker and hence, optimal strate-
gies are of the form (6) as well. Proceeding
similarly to Sections 5 and 6 we can reduce the
complexity of this problem and obtain approx-
imate solutions with computer simulations. In
Figure 6 we plot the level lines of the Ren-
dezvous value of the problem when both players
have a marker to drop off. We observe mini-
mal values around themarker dropping times (0,
0), (8, 8), (4, x) and (x, 4) (the first one being
the solution of Baston and Gal (2001)) corre-
sponding to a Rendezvous value of 24. With the
step size of the mesh of 0.00016 we get that
the optimal solution must belong in the interval
[23.99968, 24]. This requires a two-dimensional
generalization of Proposition 5. ▪
3The program may be found at http://cui.unige.ch/∼leonep/AlpernLeone
Journal/prgRDVOneMarkPlotArticle.java.
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TABLE 1 The Rendezvous values of the marker game computed at a regular mesh of 0.00016. The
minimal value computed is 24 for a marker dropping time of 4
Dropping time (x) 3.99952 3.99968 3.99984 4 4.00016 4.00032
R(x) 24.00024 24.00016 24.00008 24 24.00016 24.00032
FIGURE 6 Contour plot of the values of the Rendezvous value for the
game with two markers. The minimal value computed is 24 for dropping
times (0, 0), (8, 8), (4, x) and (x, 4) [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
To end this section, we summarize the strategies found in
the next theorem.
Theorem 9 (Two Marker Games) Solutions
for the Rendezvous problem on the line with
two markers (one for each player), with initial
distance D, are given by, see Figure 7,
f1 = [0;D], g1 = [0;D],
f2 = [D∕4;D∕4, 5D∕4], g2 = [D∕4; 3D∕4],
f3 = [D∕2;D∕2, 3D∕2], g3 = [D∕2;D∕2, 3D∕2].
The corresponding times are
t1 = t1 = D∕2, t2 = t3 = 3∕2D,
t3 = t4 = 3∕2D, t4 = t2 = 5∕2D,
t1 = t3 = 3∕4D, t2 = t1 = 3∕2D,
t3 = t2 = 3∕2D, t4 = t4 = 9∕4D,
t1 = t1 = D∕2, t2 = t2 = 3∕2D,
t3 = t3 = 2D, t4 = t4 = 2D, (10)
The Rendezvous value for all these solutions is,
R = R(f , g) = 24D∕16.
Notice that the solution provided in Theorem 2
is a solution for the two markers game as well,
the Rendevous Value being the same.
8 PROOF OF THEOREM FOR
TURN-ON-DROP
In Theorem 2 we gave an explicit strategy pair (̂f , ĝ), where
Player II drops the marker at time D/4, with expected meet-
ing time 3D/2. This established that the Rendezvous value R
satisfies R ≤ 3D∕2. Our numerical work in Sections 5 and
6, where we calculate the restricted Rendezvous value R(x)
where the dropoff time is fixed at x, for a grid of x values,
shows that R(x) is minimized at or very near the time x=D/4,
and its value is very close to 3D/2, see Figure 4.
We recall that in Proposition 3 we showed that we could
restrict strategies to those with turning points at restricted
times, including case 3 when a player drops off a marker. In
this section we further restrict strategies to those for which a
player turns when he drops off a marker. This seems reason-
able because one would drop a marker at the furtherest point
reached in a certain direction. Moreover, all the strategies we
have numerically computed satisfy this assumption. However
FIGURE 7 Solutions of the two markers game. From left to right the dropping times are (0, 0), (D/4, D/4), (D/2, D/2). The up-left solution is already known,
see (Baston & Gal, 2001) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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proving that optimal strategies have this property seems diffi-
cult. With this restriction, we are able to identify the equations
of the two straight lines in Figure 4 and thus establish that
they meet at the minimum value of x= 4. In the text we use
the term “turn-on-drop strategies” to refer to strategies that
satisfy the assumption that a player always turns at the time
he drops the marker. Accordingly we speak of “turn-on-drop
Rendezvous value” to refer to the optimal Rendezvous value
for such strategies.
In general this numerical method, based on our catego-
rization of optimal strategy pairs in Proposition 3 and bound
for Rendezvous value that are not explicitly computed in
Section 6, is how we obtain approximations to the Ren-
dezvous value. We use this method in Section 7 where we
analyze the problem of two markers. However for the sin-
gle marker game, since we know from Figure 4 that the
optimal dropping time is certainly in the interval [0, 3D/8],
we can algebraically evaluate R(x) separately for the inter-
vals [0,D/4] and [D/4, 3D/8] to show that the minimum is
uniquely attained at D/4 and that the Rendezvous value is
R = R(D∕4) = 3D∕2. Some readers may be more than will-
ing to accept this result from a perusal of Figure 4, and if so
they may skip this section.
Theorem 10 The turn-on-drop Rendezvous
value R(x), for a single marker dropped at time
x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 3D/8, is given by,
R(x) =
{
13D−4x
8
if 0 ≤ x ≤ D∕4, and
5D+4x
4
if D∕4 ≤ x ≤ 3D∕8.
(11)
It follows that the strategy pair (̂f , ĝ) given
in Theorem 2, with marker dropoff time D/4,
is optimal. The Rendezvous value is therefore
given by R = R(D∕4) = 3D∕2.
The proof of this result is obtained by combining the fol-
lowing two lemmas which give the two parts of the formula
(11) for R(x).
Lemma 11 For 0 ≤ x ≤ D/4 the optimal
restricted strategy is given by the single turn
path [D− x] for Player I and the three turn
strategy [x; x, D/2+ x, 2D− x] for Player II.
Player I turns (at time D − x) when he fails to
find the marker dropped by agent 1. The Ren-
dezvous times are given by t1 = x + D/2, t2 = D,
t3 = 2D − x and t4 = 3D − 2x. Hence R(x) =
13D∕8 − x∕2, see Figure 8(A).
Proof First note that this strategy has
expected meeting time 13D/8− x/2, as
calculated in Figure 8(A). We now use Propo-
sition 3 to show that this is the minimum. Since
the dropoff time x occurs before any possible
meeting time, x is the earliest that Player II can
turn. The general assumption of this section is
that Player II turns when dropping his marker
at time x. So the first meeting time will be
t1 = t4 = D/2 + x. The next meeting is either
t2 = t1 or t2 = t3.
In the latter case we have t2 = t3 = D + 2x.
Then it makes no difference which of the two
remaining agents is met next and the continua-
tion is as shown in Figure 8(B).
One could calculate the remaining meeting
times and show the average is above 13D/8− x/2
but an easier method is to simply remark that
the strategy in Figure 8(B) is available in the
no-marker game of Alpern and Gal (1995),
so cannot be below the no-marker Rendezvous
time of 13D/8.
So we can assume that the next meeting is at
time t2 = t1 =D, and hence for I to continue and
for II to turn. However if Player I fails to find the
marker at time D− x, he knows the other player
is below him, so he turns for the first and last
time at time D− x. The next two Rendezvous
times are t3 = t3 = 2D− x and t4 = t2 = 3D− 2x.
Thus
R(x) = 1
4
(t1 + t2 + t3 + t4)
=
(D∕2 + x) + (D) + (2D − x) + (3D − 2x)
4
= 13
8
D − 1
2
x,
as claimed and shown in Figure 8(A). ▪
We now consider the later dropoff times D/4≤ x≤ 3D/8.
Lemma 12 Suppose that D/4 ≤ x ≤ 3D/8.
Then the optimal restricted strategies are
[x+D/2] for Player I, who makes his only turn
when he meets agent 4; and
[x; x, x + D∕2,D, x + 3D∕2]
for II,with a final meeting time of t4 = 2x+ 2D,
see Figure 9. Hence the Rendezvous time is
given by
R(x) = 5D + 4x
4
. (12)
Proof We first prove the inequality
R(x) ≥ 5D + 4x
4
, or equivalently
R(x) ≥ 20 + x, for D = 16. (13)
We begin by using our program for evaluating
R(x) to calculate
R(6) = 26,
the same Rendezvous value as with no marker
found in Alpern and Gal (1995). For a≥ 0,
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(A) (B)
FIGURE 8 The marker game, strategies for x≤D/4 [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 9 The marker game, a strategy for x≥D/4 [Color figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Proposition 6 gives,
R(6 − a) ≥ R(6) − a = 26 − a, so
R(x) = R(6 − (6 − x)) ≥ 26 − (6 − x) ≥ 20 + x, giving (13).
To obtain the reverse inequality it suffices
to exhibit a Rendezvous strategy with this
expected time. The strategy pair stated in the
Lemma and drawn in Figure 9 has expected
meeting time
(x + D∕2) + (D) + (x + 3D∕2) + (2x + 2D)
4
= 5D + 4x
4
.
Since there might be better strategies, this
shows that,
R(x) ≤ 5D + 4x
4
, establishing (12). ▪
We now complete the proof of the weakened version of
Theorem 2 where we consider only restricted strategies.
Proof of Theorem 2 for turn-on-drop strategies (R ≥
3D∕2) As the Rendezvous value is linear in the initial dis-
tance D, we take D= 16 and show that R ≥ 24. Given our
FIGURE 10 The solution of the Rendezvous problem with one marker and
marker duration time D/4≤ T ≤D/2. The optimal dropping time
x= (D− T)/2 (x ∈ [D/4, 3D/8]). The optimal Rendezvous time is given by
7D − 2 T or equivalently by 5D+ 4x [Color figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
calculations shown in Figure 4, it is enough to show that
R(x) ≥ 24 for all x in [0, 6]. The formula (12) shows that R(x)
is decreasing on [0, 4] and hence less than R(x) ≤ R(4) = 24;
similarly R(x) is increasing on [4, 6] and so R(x) ≤ R(4) = 24.
Hence dropping the marker at time 4=D/4 is optimal and
R = 24 = 3D∕2.
9 EVANESCENT MARKERS
We now consider that there is a single marker which, once
dropped, lasts for an additional time T . This is realistic in
a biological scenario in which the marker is a scent mark
which is an evanescent odor. If we look back at the solution
(̂f , ĝ) to the permanent single marker problem, as drawn in
Figure 3, we see that the marker is dropped off at timeD/4 and
found at time 3D/4. So for T ≥ 3D/4−D/4=D/2, an evanes-
cent marker is as good as a permanent marker, and hence we
restrict our attention to T ≤D/2. The best solution we find
numerically for T <D/4 has Rendezvous value 13D/8. This
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FIGURE 11 Left: Plot of the optimal Rendezvous time as a function of the mark duration time T when D= 16. If T ≤D/4= 4 or T ≥D/2= 8 the solutions are
the ones stated in Theorems 1 and 2 respectively. Right: Plot of the optimal dropping time as a function of the mark duration time [Color figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
is the Rendezvous value of the game without marker stated
in Theorem 1, hence we conclude that a marker duration of
T <D/4 is useless.
As themarker duration time varies in the interval [D/4,D/2]
the Rendezvous value changes linearly, see Figures 10 and 11
and Theorem 13.
Theorem 13 Consider the one marker Ren-
dezvous problem on the line, with initial dis-
tance D and marker duration time T. Then,
• If T ≤ D/4 then the marker has no use. The solu-
tion is the same as for the no-marker game given in
Theorem 1, that is,
f ∗ = [D∕2,D∕2,D], g∗ = [D], seeFigure2.
• If T≥D/2 the solution is the same as for the marker
game in Theorem 2, that is,
f ∗ = [3D∕4], g∗ = [D∕4;D∕4, 3D∕4, 7D∕4], seeFigure3.
• If D/4 ≤ T ≤ D/2 then the best dropping off time is
given by x = (D − T)/2 and the better strategy given
by
f ∗ = [D∕2 + x], g∗ = [x; x,D∕2,D], seeFigure10.
The corresponding meeting times are
t1 = t1 = D∕2 + x, t2 = t2 = D,
t3 = t3 = 3D∕2 + x, t4 = t4 = 2D + 2x,
and the Rendezvous time is given by
RT = (20D + 16x)∕16 = (22D − 2T)∕16.
For D= 16, we have
RT =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
26 T ≤ 4,
22 − 2T 4 ≤ T ≤ 8,
24 8 ≤ T .
In Figures 11 we plot4 the upper bound for the total Ren-
dezvous time if D= 16 and the better dropping time as
functions of the marker duration time. Interestingly, this result
emphasizes that there is a relationship between the marker
duration time and the distance D between the two players. In a
biological setting, this could bound the domain of the players.
10 DISCUSSION
It is well known that when attempting to Rendezvous, agents
(people or animals) often leave markers in various forms:
notches cut on trees, stains put into water, pheromone deposits
(scent markers). The first attempt at mathematical modeling
of markers in a Rendezvous context was the classic article
of Baston and Gal (2001). Their notion of “markstart Ren-
dezvous” restricted the dropping times to the start of the
problem and showed that when both players could drop a
marker at the start, this reduced the Rendezvous time. Our
advance on that model is that we allow the players to drop
their marker or markers at times of their choice. When only
one player has a marker to drop, we find that forcing him to
drop it at the start gives the marker no value, but allowing him
to drop it at an arbitrary start gives a Rendezvous time the
same as when both players have markers but must drop them
at the start. However we find that also giving the other player
a marker to drop at a time of his choice has no further value in
reducing the Rendezvous time. Perhaps more important than
all these particular results is a new computational technique
which gives a numerical solution to more general Rendezvous
problems (could be adapted to two dimensional grid net-
works): we fix the vector of dropping times and then, similarly
to some earlier articles, reduce the resulting problem to a
finite one. Then we find a fast algorithm to solve the finite
problem. We believe this technique will allow us to attack
problems hitherto considered too difficult.
An important area of application of marker Rendezvous
problems is that of mate search in animal populations of low
density, where it may be reasonable for males and females to
4The program may be found at http://cui.unige.ch/∼leonep/
AlpernLeoneJournal/prgRDVTwoMarksEvapArticle.java.
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assume there is a single individual of the opposite sex in the
local habitat. For this application we introduced the notion of
an evanescent marker in Section 9. Our model adopts a simple
linear search region, which is often used in the Rendezvous lit-
erature. This could be seen as an idealization of a river habitat,
for example woodlands that are associated with the seasonal
watercourses characteristic of the right bank of the Rio Sao
Francisco for Rendezvous of two birds of the Spixs Macaw
(Cyanopsitta spixii) species. A captive bird from a breeding
program, of the opposite sex to the last observed wild bird
(sexed from a feather found by researchers) was released in the
vicinity of the feather. They were later seen flying together,
having successfully Rendezvoused. See Griffiths and Tlwarl
(1995) and Juniper and Yamashita (1991).
It is well documented (Mizumoto, Abe, & Dobata, 2017)
that pheromone markers are used in many species for this type
of spatial mate search, sometimes by both sexes and some-
times by only one (usually the females). An important issue
raised recently by Mizumoto et al. (2017) is the use of sexu-
ally dimorphic movement in mate search. Our model of what
is called the player-asymmetric version of Rendezvous allows
the two agents to jointly optimize their movements to mini-
mize expected meeting time. So the optimal solution might
be symmetric (same strategies employed) or asymmetric (dis-
tinct strategies). When only one agent can drop a marker, our
unique solution is asymmetric: one agent turns once while
the other turns three times (see Theorem 2). This observation
goes in the same direction as in Mizumoto et al. (2017). On
the other hand, we also find symmetric solutions, for example
the (f 3, g3) solution found in Theorem 9 for the two marker
problem. The evanescent marker problem has asymmetric
solutions, as shown in Theorem 13. The expected time to find
a mate, based on such models, can then feed into mate choice
models involving choosiness, as in the models of Alpern and
Reyniers (2005) and Etienne, Rousset, Godelle, and Cour-
tiol (2014), or the non-zero sum common interest games of
Alpern, Fokkink, Lidbetter, and Clayton (2012).
A final comment is that our Rendezvousers use determin-
istic strategies, compared to earlier models ranging from the
Brownian walker to the straight line walker in Mizumoto et al.
(2017b).
In a different field of research the use of marker is pro-
posed in Kündig, Leone, and Rolim (2016), Leone andMuñoz
(2013), Muñoz and Leone (2014) in order to build routing
paths in communication networks for the publish/subscribe
communication pattern. In the setting, markers are built of
information on published data and “pointer” towards the pub-
lisher (or the subscriber), providing a way of retrieving the
emitter of the marker efficiently.
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